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High volatility and enormous international capital flows are negative effects of the 
globalization of financial markets that can lead to financial crises like those of the 
1990s. The Tobin tax often has been put forward as a measure to diminish globalization 
risks since it is claimed to discourage short-term speculation. The arguments of the pro-
ponents of this transactions tax are based on the assumption that (i) short-term trading is 
destabilizing and speculative and causes the volatility to increase, (ii) the Tobin tax does 
discourage this speculation and (iii) the Tobin tax causes market participants to orientate 
more by macroeconomic fundamentals. This paper suggests that these assumptions are 
quite questionable. Moreover, a Tobin tax of a sensible rate would be too small to pro-
tect countries from currency fires and would generate only little monetary autonomy. In 
addition to theoretical economic doubts there arise some political problems, which can 
make the tax to become infeasible. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Today there is a worldwide academic and political discussion about chances and risks of 
globalization
1. Especially globalization of financial markets cuts both ways: On the one 
hand, financial markets with lower transaction costs and higher liquidity enhance the 
allocation of scarce capital and support trade in goods and services. Moreover, interna-
tional asset diversification and hedging opportunities lower risks, and free international 
financial markets are the doors to foreign capital, especially for emerging economies 
with low domestic savings. Thus, international financial markets raise efficiency and 
profits due to international division of labor.
2 Economic growth in emerging countries is 
not only enhanced by the availability of foreign capital but also by developing local 
financial centers that become bridges to international business.
3 On the other hand, low 
transaction costs encourage speculation, which is said to destabilize markets, especially 
speculation on foreign exchange rates.
4 High fluctuations of asset prices and exchange 
rates are a source of uncertainty for the real sector and cause misallocation. Hedging 
those risks is costly and in some cases not possible. Another crucial point against free 
financial markets is the loss of independence of economic policy.
5 Under free converti-
bility of the currency and free capital markets, autonomous economic policy is only 
possible with free floating exchange rates but not with fixed ones (‘impossible trinity’). 
Therefore, if a country’s objective is currency stability,
6 it will have to give up the inde-
pendence of its economic policy. It is no longer possible to care only about domestic 
data. External conditions have to be considered as well. Thus, governments lose their 
sovereignty over financial markets.
7 Globalization of financial markets has been raising 
global foreign exchange transactions far faster than the growth of official reserves. In 
the 1980s, daily turnover was about 600 billion US-Dollar and exceeded 1,5 trillion US-
Dollar before establishing the Euro. Today, daily transactions in the foreign exchange 
(forex) market are about 1.2 trillion US-Dollar (BIS (2001))
8. Speculative runs can now 
swamp the financial resources that central banks can mobilize to counter such runs.
9 
                                                           
1 See for example Stiglitz (2002), Deutscher Bundestag (2002) and Grefe/Greffrath/Schumann (2002). 
2 Bundesverband Deutscher Banken (1998), p.6f; Greenspan (1998), p.245f. 
3 See Sassen (1999). 
4 See Horn (1995). 
5 See Sauernheimer (1997), p.80. 
6 Currency stability is desirable and often regarded as a public good. 
7 Deutscher Bundestag (2002), p.73. 
8 Especially due to the Euro, foreign exchange transactions are lower in 2001 than they were in 1998; see 
BIS (2001), p.44f. 
9 Felix (1995) and Felix (1996); these articles are for good overview and to obtain a general idea of the 
problem and the Tobin Tax as a solution.  
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The question arises whether it were not better to regulate or to restrict international fi-
nancial markets.
10 In December 1999, the German Parliament set up a commission with 
the task to examine chances and risks of globalization. After two and a half years, the 
commission handed over a workout of more than 600 pages in June 2002. It calls for 
regulations of international financial markets, since these markets bear some systematic 
risks due to huge volume of transactions and high capital mobility. The suggestion is to 
implement a transactions tax on all foreign exchange transactions – the so-called Tobin 
tax. The idea of taxing foreign exchange transactions goes back to the proposal of James 
Tobin in 1978, but it has come into mind not until the financial crises of some emerging 
countries in the 1990s. The German Parliament is not the first one dealing with that is-
sue. As the first country in Europe the French Parliament has instituted the Tobin tax in 
November 2001, but only on condition that all the other 14 European Union member 
nations agree to do the same. Canada passed a similar resolution in 1999, making its 
introduction conditional on widespread adoption.
11 
 
This paper provides a critical view about the Tobin tax according to its concept as such, 
its efficacy and the feasibility. 
 
Chapter 2 firstly offers some backgrounds before the suitability of this transactions tax 
is discussed. Our conceptual framework is an arbitrage model with its extensions (chap-
ter 2.3) and a macroeconomic model in chapter 2.4. Most arguments of proponents of 
the Tobin tax are based on the assumption that short-term transactions are always specu-
lative and destabilizing. Thus, this transactions tax, which discourages short-term trad-
ing, can contribute to stabilizing international financial markets. We find out in chapter 
2.5 that the Tobin tax may not function as it is supposed to. Chapter 3 examines whether 
the tax would be sufficient to prevent currency crises and to enhance monetary auton-
omy. The Tobin tax seems not to be a measure, which diminishes these globalization 
risks effectively. Most doubts arise on the feasibility of the Tobin tax, which requires 
international agreement and coordination of national tax authorities (4). Chapter 5 
summarizes and concludes.  
 
                                                           
10 Bird/Rajan (2000) distinguish restraints on capital movements between capital controls (capital account 
transactions per se) and exchange controls (foreign currency transactions). 
11 Fleming (2001). 
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2. Is the Tobin Tax Desirable? 
 
With some historical notes and the distinction between two theories of speculation, this 
chapter firstly gives some essential basics for understanding the most important scien-
tific contributions to the Tobin tax discussion. In chapter 2.3 and 2.4, the extensions of 
two standard models detect some weaknesses in the generalization of these models. 
Moreover, these approaches and the argumentation involved are based on questionable 
assumptions and unclear conclusions, which are stated and defeated in 2.5. The result-
ing query is whether the Tobin tax concept besides its problems of its efficacy (chapter 
3) and its feasibility (chapter 4) makes good economic sense at all.   
 
 
2.1 Some Historical Notes
12 
 
Aware of the problems that arise with free financial markets and floating exchange rates 
after abolition of the Bretton-Woods-System - namely excessive exchange rate volatility 
and dependency of the macroeconomic and monetary policy - James Tobin expressed 
his idea of a transactions tax in his Janeway Lectures at Princeton in 1972.
13 The aim 
was to throw some sand in the wheels of super-efficient international financial markets 
when doubts about the ‘markets-always-know-best’ proposition rose. The idea fell like 
a stone in a deep well – to say it in Tobin’s words – and so he tried it again in 1978.
14 
But at that time nobody thought about limiting international financial markets just after 
abolishing the Bretton-Woods-System of pegged exchange rates. This seemed to be a 
step back, and exchange rate volatility was not regarded as a serious problem. Not until 
the 1990s when first financial crises occurred in emerging markets and international 
projects like those of the United Nations against poverty had to be financed, one re-
membered the Tobin tax (Tobin (1996)). From that moment on a worldwide political 
and academic discussion about the Tobin tax started. A very often-cited book is that of 




                                                           
12 For this whole chapter see Tobin (1978), Tobin (1996) and Tobin (1996a). 
13 Published 1974, see Tobin (1974). 
14 Tobin (1978). 
15 About this reader see Raffer (1998), Smith (1997) and Stotsky (1997). 
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Starting point is financial speculation especially on exchange rate movements that John 
Maynard Keynes already described as harmful for the functioning of financial markets 
in his famous ‘General Theory’ from 1936. Both fixed and floating exchange rate re-
gimes are vulnerable to speculation, and hence a transaction tax might help to curb 
speculation. James Tobin has two main objectives: First, he wants the exchange rate to 
reflect fundamental data rather than speculators’ expectations. In other words, excessive 
volatility has to be small. Second, the tax should give authorities more autonomy of 
national macroeconomic and monetary policy. Tax revenue is just a by-product.  
However, this last point is often the argument of proponents of the Tobin tax and critics 
of globalization, neglecting that this is no aim of the tax. We will not examine the reve-
nue raising function of the Tobin tax in this work. 
 
According to his proposal of the 70s, the Tobin tax should be levied on all spot transac-
tions on the foreign exchange market. Thus, the ad-valorem tax has to be paid twice – 
when purchasing and selling the foreign currency. The expected effect is that short-term 
round trips are penalized because the tax has to be financed within shorter periods. 
Commodity trade and long-term capital investments are said to be affected negligibly. 
The tax rate is constant and at a level of 0.1 to 1 per cent. Thus, a 0.1 per cent tax costs 
0.2 per cent each round trip for the investor. That is 48 per cent a year if transacted 
every business day (240 days), 10 per cent if every week and 2.4 per cent if every 
month (Tobin (1996)). Frankel (1996) shows that the Tobin tax penalizes short-term 
investments more the shorter the horizon.
16 To minimize the incentives to evade the tax 
or to alter the foreign exchange market structure from a decentralized dealer-driven 
market to one that is centralized and customer driven, the most appropriate rate of taxa-
tion ranges between 0.1 and 0.25 per cent. Due to increased volume in derivative trans-
actions and new derivative instruments since his first proposal, a Tobin tax limited to 
spot transactions will lead to a tax-saving reallocation of financial transactions from 
traditional spot transactions to derivative instruments.
17 All forwards, futures, swaps and 
options are to be taxed because of these alternative ways through which a speculator can 
go long or short of a currency without going himself through the spot market (Goodhart 
(1996); Bird/Rajan (2000)). 
 
 
                                                           
16 In chapter 2.3 we will refer to it in detail. 
17 See Garber/Taylor (1995), p.179f.  
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2.2 Two Theories of Speculation 
  
One of the most cited papers when discussing the Tobin tax is that of Eichen-
green/Tobin/Wyplosz (1995) in which the authors revive Tobin’s old arguments for 
putting grains of sand in the wheels of financial markets. Their idea is that financial 
market regulations like a Tobin tax or deposit requirements can raise welfare when 
these markets are responsible for shocks on labor and commodity markets. The Tobin 
tax as well as deposit requirements are measures in a second-best world
18 to diminish 
these shocks - namely excessive volatility, and are aimed at discouraging speculative 
short-term investments. The question arises whether speculative behavior is destabiliz-
ing or not. 
 
To distinguish very roughly there are two theories of speculation. One goes back to Mil-
ton Friedman (1953), who argues that speculation must be stabilizing because arbitra-
geurs are buying low and selling high. This leads to an approximation to the fundamen-
tal value and drives the market down to its warranted price. Speculators that buy high 
and sell low go out of the market. Nevertheless, the problem is that this model requires 
speculators that have an accurate estimate of the equilibrium price.
19 Then they expect 
the price to fall when it is above equilibrium and vice versa. But for the case that this 
equilibrium does not exist or cannot be seen by the market participants, it might be ra-
tional to guess that the price will move up further. 
  
Keynes (1936) describes the speculative behavior as a “beauty contest”. The goal of the 
rent-seeking speculators is not to estimate the intrinsic market value but to beat the 
market – or how Keynes would have said – to ‘anticipate what average opinion expects 
the average opinion to be’ and to ‘guess better than the crowd how the crowd will be-
have’ (from Arestis/Sawyer (1997), p.757).  
Without mentioning it, Dornbusch/Frankel (1987) agree with Keynes. Speculative bub-
bles sometimes far away from fundamentals can be rational not to lose money. More-
over, chartists often perform better especially in the short run than speculators whose 
trading decision are based on fundamental data. Therefore, short-term oriented chartists 
                                                           
18 The first-best case would be one single worldwide currency. This proposition is quite old (see Di-
mand/Dore (2000), p.523f.) and often discussed but not realistic in the near future. 
19 One great advantage of the Tobin tax is that you do not have to know the fundamental value of the 
exchange rate. By discouraging short-term speculation, the fundamental equilibrium is said to find itself. 
Therefore the Tobin tax is superior to other alternatives of limiting international financial markets 
(Menkhoff/Michaelis (1995)).  
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dominate and destabilize international financial markets.
20 Frankel (1996) refers to sur-
vey data
21 showing that bandwagon effects will occur, if trade is based on extrapolative 
expectations of short horizons. At longer horizons, speculation seems to be stabilizing. 
Based on these assumptions a Tobin tax that discourages short-term trading can help 
stabilize the foreign exchange market. 
 
 
2.3 A Model That Shows How the Tobin Tax Functions 
 
In the following, we will derive a condition for the Tobin tax burden dependent on the 
investment duration. In the standard model without implementing expectations, the ex-
pected inverse relationship between the tax burden and the holding period can be gener-
alized. However, extending the model with expected returns due to exchange rate move-
ments this desirable result holds only in periods of capital inflow.  
 
 
2.3.1 After-Tax Return Parity Condition 
 
This approach is based on that of Frankel (1996) who demonstrates the characteristic of 
the Tobin tax by setting an arbitrage condition in which after-tax returns in the domestic 
country must equal those in a foreign country. In his often-cited paper the Tobin tax is 
modeled such that only the principal is taxed twice. Since it may be difficult or even 
impossible to distinguish between the principal and interest earnings when pulling back 
the invested money, it seems to be more sensible to tax both the principal and interest 
earnings. Let i
A be the nominal interest rate in the home country A and i
B the foreign 
country nominal interest rate, y is the duration of investment measured as the number of 
years and t is the Tobin tax levied on each currency transaction. Assumed that both the 
principal and interest earnings are subject to the tax and arbitrage condition holds, after-
tax returns must be equal for whether the investment takes place in the domestic country 
or in the foreign country: 
 
(2.1)  ( )( ) y i t y i
A B + = - + 1 1   1
2 . 
 
                                                           
20 See Dornbusch/Frankel (1987) and Frankel (1996) in their conclusion. 
21 See Frankel (1993).  
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Solving for the foreign rate of return gives: 
 

















As we can see from the second term of the right-hand side, the burden of the Tobin tax 
is inversely related to the duration of the foreign investment since the longer the in-
vestment-duration the lower the required foreign rate of return. To show it mathemati-
cally we take the first derivative of equation (2.2) with respect to the duration y: 
 




















In this framework, short-term speculative investments are always discouraged by the 
Tobin tax.  
 
 
2.3.2 A More Comprehensive Approach 
 
The shortcoming of the Frankel model as well as the model above is, that the invest-
ment decision, normally based on expected upward or downward moves of the ex-
change rate, is not modeled. As we will see, expectations are the clue of the story. 
To model it more comprehensively
22, we can write: 
 







B + = ￿ - +
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t is the spot exchange rate (domestic currency unit per unit of foreign currency) 
and E
t+1 the expected exchange rate. Solving for the required rate of return abroad, 
 
(2.5) 


















= + + . 
 
                                                           
22 See Rajan (2001), p.10ff. and Bird/Rajan (2001), p.31ff.  
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For the case in which the investor expects neither gain nor loss due to exchange rate 
movements, that is E
t+1 equals E
t, we get the same result as above shown in equation 
(2.2) and (2.3). But there is no doubt about that expected exchange rate movements are 
the reasons the speculate on currencies. Thus, the implicit assumption that E
t+1 equals E
t 
is very restrictive and neglects totally the speculator’s motivation. 







































will have to hold, if the burden of the Tobin tax should be inversely related to the dura-
tion of the foreign investment. In periods of capital inflow when investors assume the 
foreign exchange rate to appreciate, condition (2.7) holds and therefore short-term in-
vestments face a higher Tobin tax burden. More critical are periods of capital outflow. 
In this case, expected depreciation of the domestic currency might be too large to satisfy 
condition (2.7). A Tobin tax of 1 per cent implies that the expected depreciation of the 
currency must not be larger than approximately 2 per cent. In currency crises when de-
preciations of more than 20 per cent are expected, even a Tobin tax of 10 per cent is not 
able to hinder the vicious effect of discouraging long-term investments since equation 
(2.7) is not satisfied.  
The model yields two results: First, it is only in periods of capital inflow that the Tobin 
tax can reach its objective in stabilizing foreign exchange markets by discouraging 
short-term speculation. Second, in periods of panic the Tobin tax has a ‘perverse’ effect 
since real investments of longer horizons face higher tax burdens. The conclusion is 
clear-cut: The Tobin tax is not a measure to manage crises and - if at all - should be ap-
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2.4 A Model in Which a Reduction in Short-Term Speculation is Stabilizing 
 
After having discussed the microeconomic approach based on an investor’s arbitrage 
calculus in the preceding chapter we now turn to a macroeconomic model. As we will 
see a reduction in short-term speculation and higher responsiveness of long-term inves-
tors to their expectation reduce the volatility of the spot exchange rate. However, incor-
porating the long-term equilibrium exchange rate through the purchasing power parity 
(PPP) leads to the result that independence of macroeconomic policy goes hand in hand 
with higher exchange rate variability, and that volatility increases over time.  
   
 
2.4.1 A Macroeconomic Model
23 
 
Consider again a world of two countries, A (domestic) and B (foreign). Let E
t be the 
spot exchange rate between the two currencies, m the supply of domestic assets relative 
to foreign assets and d the relative demand for domestic assets. E
t, m and d are in log 
form. We then can write 
 
(2.8)  u d m E
t + - = , 
 
when the exchange rate is determined by the ratio of the relative supply to the relative 
demand for domestic assets; and u is an unknown error term. Imagine a fraction of w 
long-term investors i whose investment decisions are based on economic fundamentals, 
and a fraction of (1-w) market participants s that engage in short-term speculation 
(chartists). We can rewrite the demand 
 
(2.9)  ( )
s i d w wd d ￿ - + = 1 . 
 
The long-term investors i (often called “fundamentalists”) expect the exchange rate to 
converge to equilibrium while speculators have extrapolative forecasts. That is to say, 
they expect the exchange rate to diverge from equilibrium and thus creating a bubble 
not to lose money.  E  denotes the exchange rate equilibrium, q is the investors’ rate of 
                                                           
23 Frankel (1996), p.71f. 
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expected convergence and v is the chartists’ expected rate of divergence of the spot rate 
from the long run equilibrium.  
Then the expected depreciations (exp dep) of the two market participants can be written 
as 
 
(2.10a)  ( ) E E q
t - ￿ - =
i dep   exp     
and 
(2.10b)  ( ) E E v





s f are the demand elasticities of the two market participants for for-
eign assets with respect to their corresponding expectations. Accordingly, we may re-
write the relative demand for domestic assets d as follows: 
 
(2.11)  ( ) ( ) ( ) E E v f w E E q wf d
t s t i - ￿ ￿ - - - ￿ = 1 . 
 
Solving for the spot rate, we obtain 
 
(2.12)  ] ) 1 ( [ u E q wf E v f w m E





q wf v f w
i s + ￿ - -
=




From (2.12), the variance (Var) of the spot rate is 
 
(2.14)  ( ) ( ) u m Var  E Var 
2 t + ￿ =a . 
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The variability of the spot exchange rate decreases with increasing proportion of long-
term investors.  





) (E Var   
     and      0
f  













The more sensitive or responsive the speculators are to their expectations the higher the 
volatility of the foreign exchange rate. In response, the higher the responsiveness of 
investors to their expectation the lower the volatility of the spot exchange rate.  
This means a Tobin tax, which discourages short-term speculation or makes all market 
participants orientate more by macro fundamentals would result in a lower volatility of 
the spot exchange rate. 
 
 
2.4.2 Extending the Model
24 
 
In the model, the long-term equilibrium exchange rate  E  is assumed exogenous. How-
ever, referring to economic literature
25 the Purchasing Power Parity can be taken for 








B refer to the price levels in the home and in the foreign country.
26 We 
can now rewrite (2.12) obtaining 
 
(2.18)  ( ) { } u p p v f w q wf m E




                                                           
24 Bird/Rajan (1999), p.8ff. and Bird/Rajan (2001), p.28ff. 
25 See for example Mishkin (2000). 
26 Remember that all variables are in log form.  
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The variance then is 
 
(2.19)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
B d d
d
p , p   Cov 1 p m,   Cov p m,   Cov 1 2                           
u Var  p Var  p Var  1 m Var  E Var 
A B A
B A 2 2 t
￿ - + - ￿ - ￿ -
+ + ￿ - + = ￿a
 
 
if the disturbance term u is assumed to be uncorrelated with prices and relative asset 
supply. Ignoring the covariances, Bird and Rajan conclude an increase in the variability 
of the exchange rate by endogenizing  E  compared to a situation where it is treated ex-




B) is close to zero and the volatility of the foreign 
exchange rate is higher. In other words, the costs of policy independence are high ex-
change rate variability. Another finding is that volatility increases over time. The pro-
portion of speculators rises because of higher uncertainty about fundamentals due to 
higher volatility of the exchange rate. To say it in words of Bird/Rajan there may be a 
vicious cycle or self-fulfilling prophecy in which speculation and variability feed on 
each other in the short term.   
 
 
2.5 Questionable Assumptions and Conclusions 
 
Proponents of the Tobin tax may argue in line with Frankel: Short-term trading is 
speculative and is the cause for excessive volatility. Therefore, a Tobin tax, which is 
more burdensome for speculators, especially extrapolating chartists, stabilizes the for-
eign exchange rate because the fraction of long-term investors orientated by fundamen-
tals increases. This argument is based on three assumptions: First, short-term trading is 
destabilizing and speculative and causes the volatility to increase. Second, the Tobin tax 
really discourages this speculation. Third, the Tobin tax causes the market participants 
to orientate more by macroeconomic fundamentals.
28 In the following, we will examine 
these three assumptions and will find out that they are quite questionable. 
 
 
                                                           
27 The opposite would be highly correlated price levels when one country pegs its exchange rate to the 
other. 
28 The third assumption seems to be similar to the second but the idea is to distinguish between specula-
tors that go out of the market (higher w in our model) and speculators that stay in the market but with 
lower responsiveness to their extrapolating expectations (lower f 
sv) or with higher responsiveness to their 
expectation that the exchange rate will converge (higher f 
iq).  
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2.5.1 Is Short-Term Investment Always Speculative And Destabilizing? 
 
Bird/Rajan (1999) provide a summary of the literature about market participants. The 
main result is that there exist two kinds of participants: On the one hand there are inves-
tors who make use of conventional macroeconomic exchange rate theories, the so called 
‘fundamentalists’, on the other hand there are speculators who engage in extrapolating 
analytical techniques, the so called chartists. The surveys finds out the chartists to 
dominate the forex market in the short run, both according to number and to perform-
ance. As we have already assumed in our model the chartists are trend-chasers. That 
means they buy when the currency appreciates and sell when the currency depreciates 
since they extrapolate past exchange rate movements into the future. They do not ob-
serve macroeconomic fundamentals. Real investors (to avoid the expression ‘fundamen-
talists’) become more important in the long run. They do observe macroeconomic data 
and compare the spot exchange rate with an equilibrium exchange rate based on these 
fundamentals. Thus, they sell when the currency appreciates and seems to be above 
equilibrium and they buy when the currency seems to be undervalued. These specula-
tors á la Friedman behave as arbitrageurs and help to stabilize the foreign exchange rate.  
Summers/Summers (1989) bring it to the point:
29 Real investors (based on fundamen-
tals) have negative feedback and reduce volatility by bringing back the price (exchange 
rate) to equilibrium. There is no need to trade frequently; therefore, this stabilizing 
‘value investing’ occurs in the long run. Speculation involves positive feedback and 
tends to increase volatility. This destabilizing behavior goes with short-term horizons. 
 
However, there are some counter-arguments to this view: Assumed it is true that short-
term trading is speculative and causes the volatility to increase. Liberalization and de-
regulation of the international financial markets and the possibility to buy and sell every 
second world wide due to modern information and communication technology tend to 
increase the number of short-term speculators. Therefore, exchange rate volatility must 
have risen over the last twenty years. De Grauwe (2000) shows that there is no evidence 
for increased exchange rate volatility. In a former work, he examined the mean average 
monthly changes and the standard deviations of the four big currencies namely US-
Dollar, Yen, Pound and Deutsche Mark over last three decades from 1973 until 1996. 
The result is that there is nearly no difference in the degree of variability of the ex-
                                                           
29 Note that Summers and Summers focus on the security market, but most of their findings hold for the 
foreign exchange market as well.  
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change rates, even a small decline of volatility in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.
30 De 
Grauwe concludes the assumption that short-term trades are speculative and thus desta-
bilizing, to be false. Up to 70 per cent of the exchange rate volume, short-term transac-
tions inclusive are interdealer and can be explained by hedging strategies and not specu-
lation. Lyons (2001) calls the passing of unwanted positions from dealer to dealer 
following an initial customer trade ‘hot potato trading’ to which we will refer in the next 
chapter. As we will see a Tobin tax would thus be burdensome to desirable transactions.  
Further arguments can be found in Dooley (1996). There seems to be no evidence that 
speculators engage only in short-term investments. Truly, their forecasts are based on 
short horizons but this does not say anything about their time period in which they are 
long or short of a currency. There is no rule saying to trade frequently. Moreover, direct 
investments are not always of long-term character. The easiest hedge of a direct invest-
ment in a foreign country is to take a local bank loan there. In the case of panic, one can 
run off the country leaving behind the investment project and the loan without loosing 
much. Direct investors and international holders of long-term capital do not necessarily 
hold their positions longer than those of short-term capital. On the contrary, they might 
be the first pulling out their capital when the atmosphere changes. If real investment and 
short-term capital do not differ from each other according to time series behavior, a 
Tobin tax will not have any effect to the composition of capital flows. 
To argue the other way round there is no evidence that short-term projects tend to be 
less desirable than long-term projects. A transaction tax would increase transaction 
costs with the aim to discourage short-term trading in order to diminish market volatil-
ity. The conclusion is that markets with high transaction costs are less volatile than in-
ternational financial markets, especially the foreign exchange market. Yet, the markets 
for housing or land, for instance, with high transaction costs are not more volatile than 






                                                           
30 This finding stands in contrast to what BIS (2001a, p.99) suggests, probably due to different methods in 
determining volatility and new data. Volatility among Dollar, Yen and Euro exchange rates increased in 
the last two decades except for the Euro/Dollar market. In BIS (2002, p.91) 23 currencies are examined 
according to exchange rate volatility in 1995/1996 and 1999-2002. Over all with only few exceptions, 
volatility has increased. 
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2.5.2 Does a Tobin Tax Really Discourage Destabilizing Speculation (Only)? 
 
The idea of the Tobin tax is to diminish volatility by discouraging short-term specula-
tion that is said to be destabilizing. In the previous chapter, we have already found out 
that it is not clear-cut whether these transactions really contribute to higher volatility. 
Nevertheless, assume short-term transactions to be destabilizing. Then, is a Tobin tax in 
fact burdensome to speculation or does it discourage desirable transactions as well? 
The argument proponents of the Tobin tax put forward is the inverse relation between 
tax burden and duration of the foreign investment as we have shown in chapter 2.3.1. 
Yet, we already know some restrictions when we extend the model by modeling expec-
tations on future exchange rates. In the case of capital outflow, a contrary effect occurs 
that stands in sharp contrast to what Tobin (1978) and Frankel (1996)
31 suggest. 
 
Davidson (1997) doubts whether it makes sense at all to model the Tobin tax burden 
depending on the holding period, since the Tobin tax, like all transactions costs, is inde-
pendent of the round trip time interval. Therefore, he compares situations with and 
without a Tobin tax in which investors have to decide whether to buy or to sell and he 
determines the tax rate that way (we will come to this in detail later). 
Dooley (1996) points out that the costs of taxing international currency transactions 
might be higher than its benefits. He refers to Kupiec (1995) who examined a transac-
tions tax levy in a framework in which noise-traders cause the asset prices to behave 
more volatile. On the one hand, transactions taxes reduce asset price volatility, on the 
other hand they cause the asset prices to fall due to cumulated and discounted taxes that 
are expected in the future. It is shown that the costs are higher than the benefits. Accord-
ing to foreign exchange markets, the paper suggests the Tobin tax not to be desirable. 
Now let us refer to what we have already mentioned above. About two-third of total 
foreign exchange volume is amongst dealers and can be explained by hot potato trading. 
Hot potato trading is the search process for a counterparty, which is willing to accept a 
new currency position. Every currency dealer wants to restore the old equilibrium ac-
cording to his risk-aversion when he is too long or too short of a currency due to a cus-
tomer order. Thus, the passing of unwanted positions is a consequence of dealers’ risk 
management. Lyons (1997) suggests that hot potato trading is consistent with a dealer’s 
optimizing behavior. Assume there are many risk-averse currency dealers that are stay-
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
31 Just like Summers/Summers (1989) and Stiglitz (1989) according to security markets.  
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ing in their portfolio equilibrium. Now, one of them gets out of balance due to a cus-
tomer sale of 10 million in foreign currency. Willing to carry only 10 per cent of this 
initial order, he searches for another dealer wanting to buy 9 million. Every dealer in the 
chain just wants to hold 10 per cent. Consequently, the initial volume of 10 million of 
foreign currency leads to an overall interdealer trade of 90 million. Thus, this very sim-
ple model shows that 90 per cent of total market volume is amongst dealers in order to 
hedge risks. Lyons (2001) states that 90 per cent is fairly too high but hot potato trading 
amounting up to 70 per cent of total market volume is realistic. There are two main ef-
fects: First, the price decline of the foreign currency will be smaller, if many dealers 
carry only a fraction of the initial order instead of one dealer who is willing to hold all. 
This stems from the (realistic) assumption that dealers are risk averse and thus have 
concave utility functions. Higher positions will only be carried, if a higher risk premium 
is paid. Second, total risk is shared amongst many dealers and therefore can be spread 
around more efficiently. A tax levy on each trade causes this search for risk spreading to 
become more expensive and consequently ends up with higher risks in the foreign ex-
change market and higher volatility.
32  
 
Moreover, a Tobin tax would be more burdensome to the initial order based on real 
trade and followed by a chain of, for instance, 4 dealers than to pure speculation. As-
sumed that the Tobin tax is at a rate of 0,5 per cent and every dealer carries 5 per cent, 
the hot potato trading would be taxed as follows: 
 
(2.20) 
.   % 85 . 1                             
3.71 0.5%                             




+ + + ￿ =
 
 
As we can see, the tax burden of the hedging chain is 3.71 times higher than for a pure 
speculative transaction. Thus, the Tobin tax does not discourage destabilizing specula-
tion but risk-lowering hedging. 
Davidson (1997) argues similar but concludes differently. More roughly than in (2.20) 
one can say that the tax burden is 4 times higher for international trade transaction fol-
lowed by hot potato trading than for short-term speculative transactions without hedg-
ing. This means that a Tobin tax of 0,5 per cent is equivalent to a 2 per cent tax on all 
foreign trade in goods and services, whereas speculation is taxed at a rate of 0,5 per 
                                                           
32 De Grauwe (2000), p.395.  
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cent. This is exactly the opposite of Tobin’s intention. Moreover, the multiplier effect of 
the Tobin tax due to hot potato trading can lead to wider bid ask spreads. This must be 
taken into account and therefore the tax rate has to be only a fraction of what the origi-
nal proposal suggests. Goodhart (1996) suspects the markets to become thinner because 
buyers as well as sellers go out of the market. It therefore takes longer for the market 
maker to match sell and buy orders, what means higher risks and longer periods in 
which the money is tied up. This makes markets more expensive and more volatile. For 
Palley (2001) this seems to be an unlikely outcome since the Tobin tax is to be levied at 
a low rate, and the transaction volume of the foreign exchange market is that enormous. 
Moreover, a Tobin tax contributes only little to higher transactions costs and interna-
tional financial markets were not thinner when transactions costs were higher before the 
technological revolution. 
  
In the original proposal, Tobin suggests to tax foreign exchange transactions on the spot 
market only. For a speculator who bets on a 10 per cent appreciation of the US-Dollar it 
would then be rational to go through the derivative markets instead of the spot market. 
He would swap a German Government bond for a U.S. Treasury security in order to be 
long in US-Dollars. At the time of maturity, only net profits are transferred. So, if the 
US-Dollar in fact appreciates by 10 per cent, only these 10 per cent net profit will go 
through the spot market and will be taxed. Assume a Tobin tax of 1 per cent, the tax 
burden for this speculation is 0.1 per cent. In contrast, investors that go through the spot 
market are forced to pay the tax twice to the total volume and not only to net profits. 
The tax burden for a round trip then is 2.1 times 1 per cent or 2.1 per cent. Exporters 
and importers have to go through the spot market as well but only once (there is no 
round trip) and pay 1 per cent. We see again that the Tobin tax does not discourage 
short-term speculation. Most proponents of the Tobin tax are aware of the necessity to 
tax derivatives, too. But taxing only the foreign exchange segment of the derivative 
markets would not be sufficient since the international financial markets are linked to-
gether through derivatives. Efficient measures to avoid any distortions would end up in 
regulations that would be a step back of 20 years (De Grauwe (2000)). Eichen-
green/Wyplosz (1996) do not find it necessary to levy the Tobin tax to derivatives. 
Their counterargument runs as follows: In the chain of hot potato trading that was initi-
ated for instance by a customer forward, there will be a dealer who seeks to close his 
open position through a purchase on the spot market. The authors conclude that in this 
way the initial forward is taxed either. Yet, this seems to be unrealistic since there is no  
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evidence that one dealer closes his position on the spot market when he can pass the hot 
potato to anyone else. Moreover, Eichengreen/Wyplosz (1996) as well as Grözinger 
(2001) assume that every dealer passes the whole amount and not only a fraction of the 
initial order. If every dealer carries a fraction, the volume of hot potato trade will de-
cline gradually without underlying taxation. Finally, it can hardly be the objective of the 
tax to raise the burden to the customer order and the following hedging. The aim is to 
discourage speculation if it was destabilizing. A speculator that trades with derivatives 
is not affected by a Tobin tax levied on a spot transaction to close an open position at 
the end of a hot potato chain. Goodhart (1996) and Garber/Taylor (1995) regard it as a 
must to tax derivatives. In addition, small amounts have to be exempted from the tax in 
order to avoid deadweight costs when for example travelers need some foreign cash. 
Otherwise, the tax burden would fall on tourists, exporters and importers while traders 
of ‘hot money’ are able to avoid the tax.  
 
 
2.5.3 Does a Tobin Tax Make the Market Participants Orientate More by Fundamen-
tals? 
 
General results of economic theory show that the group of market participants is hetero-
geneous. To distinguish very roughly there are those whose expectations are based on 
macroeconomic data – or to speak for all financial markets – on fundamentals, and 
those who anticipate the reaction of the other traders due to new information – the so 
called noise-trader who seek to gauge market psychology. The way to show that a trans-
actions tax make market participants model more on fundamentals is to illustrate that 
the tax has more impact on noise-traders so that real investors (‘fundamentalists’) will 
dominate the market. We have already demonstrated above the most common attempt 
that, however, is based on questionable assumptions and uncertain consequences.  
Stiglitz (1989) argues differently: Suppose there are four different categories of market 
participants. Highly informed individuals with insider information, basically informed 
traders that perform on the market average, the real investors that orientate by funda-
mentals, and the noise-traders as explained above. A transactions tax – and focusing on 
the foreign exchange market – the Tobin tax would have no impact on the insider and 
hardly any impact on the basically informed individuals and real investors. But there is 
likely an effect on noise-traders. Ex ante they are sure to beat the average but since the 
market casino is a zero-sum game at least half of them are wrong. Therefore, ex post  
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they would be better off not to have gambled. A transactions tax could stop the fools 
from gambling and diminish losses. However, this argument is not persuasive. First, 
Stiglitz’s effort is also based on the assumption that noise-trading as a kind of specula-
tion has short-term character and is destabilizing and that a transactions tax discourages 
exactly this speculation. Above, we find out that this is open to discussion. Second, the 
belief to be smarter than the average of all market participants is based - once again - on 
expectations. It is clear that a Tobin tax of some basis points cannot stop a speculator 
from trading when he expects good profits even foolishly. Third, there is no reason to 
intervene in the market just because some gamblers lose money. Since it is a zero-sum 
game, the amount that a fool loses will win another speculator – just a redistribution of 
money. The case for a tax levy would be negative external effects on desirable trades 
and, to which we come next, excessive waste of resources that are not productive. 
 
In general, businesses like investment banks acting on international financial markets 
attract a lot of talented human capital – for Summers/Summers (1989) too much human 
capital that is not creating wealth. International financial markets as we have today 
waste too much private resources to operate and government resources to police. A 
comparison of the income of corporations noted at the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the income of member firms of the NYSE suggests that one-fourth of total 
corporation profit is spent for financial engineering, costs of information and other non 
direct payments included.  
It is clear that investments on international financial markets are a zero-sum game. That 
is, speculators seek in acquiring information to win against other market participants. 
Normally however, this information does not affect production decisions or the real 
value of a currency, to speak for foreign exchange markets, but only the price of the 
asset or currency. As a result, there are only private but no additional social gains when 
this information is the basis for trading. What takes place is an excessive investment in 
gathering information in order to be ahead of the other traders. The motivation is that 
the ‘winner takes it all’, and thus speculator’s goal is to get the information first. But if 
everybody in the market invests that much in acquiring information nobody will have 
any competitive advantage. It is rational to invest as long as the marginal private return 
equals the marginal costs, which is equal, the opportunity costs or the return elsewhere 
without information costs. Stiglitz (1989) concludes that the net marginal social return 
is negative since their private return is more than the social return as mentioned above. 
This rent-seeking makes everybody worse off due to excessive expenditures on gather- 
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ing information in this Keynesian beauty-contest. One may then think that prices con-
tain all information. Yet, most of the information does not go back to fundamental data 
but are short-term pseudo signals that are incorporated psychologically. A transactions 
tax like the Tobin tax with much higher impact on short-term investment seems to be 
good policy against wasting resources that otherwise could be productive and creating 
wealth. Moreover, traders that remain in the market do no longer base their expectations 
on short-term pseudo signals but on long-term fundamental data making the market less 
volatile and the price containing useful information. But this analysis is not more than 
another reason for limiting international financial markets and does not offer any evi-
dence that the Tobin tax reaches its purposes since its function of discouraging short-
term speculation is questionable.  
Furthermore, Davidson (1998) detects some inconsistency in Stiglitz’s arguments. On 
the one hand, transactions taxes enhance efficiency in financial markets, on the other 
hand transactions taxes levied on goods markets are not desirable. Stiglitz’s only expla-
nation of the excessive volatility of the international financial markets is the irrational 
behavior of fools, which are born every minute. The counter-argument is that in finan-
cial markets there exist fools since decades in which they are not being pushed out of 
the market in the sense of a Darwinian process. So even in the long run there are fools 
affecting market prices; and there is no evidence that pervasive irrationality does not 
exist in all product markets. Davidson (1998) argues that expectations matter and cause 
individuals to speculate. Therefore, a Tobin tax cannot be efficient but a creditable mar-
ket maker with a great buffer stock who guarantees an unchanging spot market price 
over time. Those who speculate then are in fact fools and will lose. 
 
Some more evidence that market participants could orientate more by fundamentals by 
levying a Tobin tax offer Menkhoff/Michaelis (1993). A Tobin tax decreases the sensi-
tivity of foreign exchange traders according to expected changes of exchange rates and 
hence causes them to adjust to fundamentals. In addition, a Tobin tax contributes to pre-
venting the emergence of speculative bubbles and makes the bubbles happen to burst 
earlier than they would without a tax. 
In summary signs are emerging, that a Tobin tax could make investors model more on 
fundamental data but there are some strong counter-arguments. It will be difficult to 
find out how market participants would react, if once a tax on foreign exchange transac-
tions was levied. 
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But what we have learned from this chapter is that it is not clear-cut and really question-
able whether the Tobin tax as proposed could be desirable since the assumptions the 
proposal is based on are not fulfilled obviously. Even the inverse relationship between 
holding period and tax burden – the whole point of the Tobin tax – does not hold gener-
ally.          
 
 
3. Is a Small Tobin Tax Sufficient? 
 
In the previous chapter, we have examined whether the Tobin tax is desirable according 
to its proponents’ objective to stabilize international financial markets and to diminish 
globalization risks. The approach was more from the point of view of quality. In the 
following, we will turn our attention to quantitative issues. Are grains of sand in the 
wheels of international financial markets sufficient to establish stability when good 
speculative profits are expected or panic occurs? Can a small Tobin tax create enough 
governmental autonomy for national economic policy?  The findings of this chapter will 
be that the Tobin tax is not sufficient a measure for preventing financial crises and can-
not have the power to generate much monetary autonomy. On the contrary, the foolish 
trust in being protected from speculative attacks and exchange rate fluctuations could be 
dangerous.   
 
 
3.1 The Tobin Tax and Crisis Prevention 
 
In 2.5.2, we already mentioned Davidson’s (1997) doubts whether it is sensible to de-
termine the tax burden depending on the round trip interval since all transactions taxes 
normally are independent of the holding period. A more reasonable approach is the 
comparison of the two states with and without a Tobin tax levy. Assume that p
t is the 
price of a foreign asset today and p
t+1 is the expected price for the next period denomi-
nated in a certain currency. To analyze the effect of expected exchange rates and not 




t) > 0, an appreciation of the currency will be expected; if (p
t+1 – p
t) < 0, a 
depreciation will be expected. Moreover, q is the future expected income and c the car-
rying costs of holding the financial asset, opportunity costs included. Net earnings then  
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appear to be (q – c). Let T be transactions costs for every purchase or sale. If no Tobin 
tax is levied, an investor will buy, if 
 
(3.1)  0 ) ( ) (
1 > - + -
+ t t p p c q , 
 
and will sell, if 
 
(3.2)  0 ) ( ) (
1 < - + -
+ t t p p c q . 
 
The easiest case one can imagine is when money as an asset is hold. There is no future 
net income (q – c = 0) and there occur no transactions costs (T = 0). Thus, a speculator 
























This is quite easy to see since the terms on the left-hand sides are the gross growth rates 
of the exchange rate.  
In the following, the Tobin tax (t) is modeled. As we know, the Tobin tax is due twice 
on a round trip. Therefore, the investor will go long, if 
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while he will go short, if 
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Comparing now inequalities (3.7) and (3.8) with (3.3) and (3.4) we conclude that the 
expected change in the exchange rate in the world with a Tobin tax levy must not be     
{[(1 + t) / (1 – t)] – 1} x 100 per cent greater than the maximum expected change in the 
no tax case not to induce bullishness or bearishness. For example without a Tobin tax 
there is no incentive to buy a currency due to transactions costs and negative net earn-
ings although expected appreciation is 0.5 per cent. Then in the case of Tobin Tax at a 
rate of 1 per cent, expected appreciation must not be greater than 0.5 + 2.02 = 2.52 per 
cent not to induce bullish behavior. The 1 per cent Tobin tax corresponds to a 104 per 
cent tax burden if traded every week (52 weeks a year). This sounds much and seems to 
be deterrent for every short-term speculation. But if one expects an additional apprecia-
tion of the exchange rate of 2.02 per cent independent from the time period, he will buy. 
So even a 1 per cent Tobin tax is very fine sand in the wheels of international financial 
markets and cannot diminish globalization risks like speculative attacks and financial 
crises. Davidson (1997) states that in the case of the Mexican tequila crisis in 1994/1995 
the peso fell by about 60 per cent during weeks. That would have required a Tobin tax 
of more than 23 per cent! As a result, the speculator will trade as soon as there are ex-
pected overall capital gains or losses. A Tobin tax that does not tax these gains fully at a 




                                                           
33 In Davidson (1997) the author proposes a regulatory framework of international finance built upon an 
international money clearing unit (IMCU) as the only liquid asset allowed as reserves and a mechanism 
that puts the burden of adjustment in international finance on countries experiencing surplus in their trade 
balance. While De Angelis (1999-2000) agree with Davidson according to the shortcomings of the Tobin 
tax, the proposal is controversially discussed; see also Davidson (1999-2000). 
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3.2 The Tobin Tax and Monetary Autonomy 
 
The restoration or maintenance of autonomy for national macroeconomic and monetary 
policy is the second objective of the Tobin tax. As James Tobin writes in his proposal of 
1978, viable differentials of interest rates between economies are hard and costly to per-
petuate due to massive movements of funds. That is, central banks and governments are 
no longer able to model on national economic requirements but have to orientate by 
external circumstances neglecting domestic issues like employment, output and price 
level. The idea is to reduce trading volume on international financial markets as a whole 
and in particular speculation. Central banks’ market interventions become more effec-
tive and governments can concentrate on domestic policy issues.  
There is another way to discuss this problem. The content of the ‘impossible trinity’ is 
that it is not possible to reach all of the three political goals simultaneously, namely in-
ternational financial openness, monetary autonomy, and stability of nominal exchange 
rates. To establish financial openness and a stable currency for example in a fixed ex-
change rate regime the country has to give up monetary independence since stable ex-
change rates require central bank market interventions in order to cope with capital mo-
bility. The national amount of money can no longer be adjusted to domestic conditions. 
The other way round the price for financial openness and monetary autonomy is flexible 
exchange rates that suffer from volatility. Some argue that a Tobin tax might cut down 
the openness of international financial markets a little so as to re-establish some mone-
tary independence while exchange rates are fixed.
34 
 
Frankel (1996) is skeptical whether a small Tobin Tax is a sufficient measure to sacri-
fice financial openness creating autonomy for national economic policy. In 1992 and 
1993, when dealers speculated against the narrow bands of the European exchange rate 
system (ERM) a Tobin tax would not have been deterrent. The same holds for Mexico 
1994 and Asia 1997. In Frankel’s opinion, monetary autonomy goes hand in hand with 
large variability of the exchange rates.  
By applying the interest parity conditions and by introducing the Tobin tax, it is possi-
ble to determine a maturity-dependent interest rate band in which the national interest 
rate can differ from the foreign interest rate without incentives to move money. It is 
assumed that the foreign interest rate i
B is fixed at a certain level, lets say of 10 per cent. 
                                                           
34 See Buch/Heinrich/Pierdzioch (2001), p.19. 
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If the interest parity condition holds, after-tax returns in the foreign and in the domestic 
country will be equal. The following approach underlines best the results of De Grauwe 
(2000) who does not present any modeling framework. Let i
A be the domestic interest 
rate, t the Tobin tax and y the maturity in years, then the interest rate parity conditions 
(see equation 2.1) can be written as: 
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By fixing the foreign interest rate i
B at 10 per cent and the Tobin tax t at 0.1 per cent we 
get the domestic interest rate i
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The domestic interest rate i
A can be interpreted as the lower limit of a interest rate band 
in which national interest rates can be set independently. Obviously, the lower limit 
increases with longer maturities and approximates the foreign interest rate.  
Equation (3.9) expresses a situation in which a local investor is indifferent between in-
vesting at home or in the foreign country. To get the upper limit of the interest rate band 
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This upper bound decreases with longer maturity y but approximates to the foreign in-
terest rate of 10 per cent, either. As a result, the free interest rate band is symmetric to 
the constant foreign interest rate, is broad for short maturities and becomes thinner for 
longer terms. In the very long run it vanishes. For example, while the band covers 3-
month interest rates from 1.8 to 18.3 per cent it decreases from 8.8 to 11.2 per cent for a 
maturity of 2 years. In the 5-years run the band narrows to 9.4 – 10.6 per cent. The 
breadth of the band can be regarded as the degree of national autonomy of setting inter-
est rates independently. 
Jetin/De Brunhoff (2000) mistakenly calculate the degree of independence directly from 
equation (2.2) of the Frankel model, overlooking that in this model the domestic interest 
rate is fixed and that the interest rate parity condition is solved for the foreign return. 
The second and graver shortcoming is that the authors neglect the upper or the lower 
limit – which depends on the point of view. Therefore, they get the degree of freedom of 
setting interest rates nationally to be half as much. Nevertheless, national autonomy in 
setting short-term interest rates is quite sizeable. But to attract real investments and to 
police national economic issues the long-term interest rate matters. As we can see, at the 
long end the national interest rate is still determined by the foreign interest rate since the 
interest rate band disappears. The interest rate band may be wider for short maturities as 
we suggest above because we modeled the Tobin tax to be due only once. According to 
the Frankel model in 2.3.1, especially speculators with short horizon calculate to be 
charged the Tobin tax twice. But the result that national autonomy vanishes at the long 
end still remains.    
For Arestis/Sawyer (1997) it seems to be straightforward that a Tobin tax of say 0.1 per 
cent cannot contribute to much difference of interest rates although the tax burden and 
hence the deterrent effect increases with shorter holding periods. The only argument for 
more monetary autonomy through a Tobin tax is that central bank interventions become 
more effective since official reserves increase relative to the volume of transactions. 
The economy may withstand more external shocks and runs on its currency hence creat-
ing more independence of monetary policy.     
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Finally, the belief of effective protection against speculative attacks when a Tobin tax is 
levied can be regarded as additional autonomy for national economic policies. But this 
attitude bears some risks especially when national authorities mistakenly consider the 
national economy to be secure from external financial attacks and crises. The upshot 
could be careless monetary and financial policy, and unfavorable economic develop-
ments could not be revised. The probability of financial crises would increase.
35 
 
The conclusion is clear-cut: Even if the Tobin tax was desirable according to its con-
cept, the expected increase in monetary and fiscal autonomy would not occur and it 
would not fulfill its task in preventing national financial crises because every sensible 
height of the tax rate would be too small. 
 
 
4. Feasibility of the Tax 
 
The results of the previous chapters suggest that from the theoretical point of view a 
Tobin Tax is not an efficient measure to stabilize foreign exchange markets and to con-
tribute to national monetary autonomy. Besides the theoretical analysis, the question of 
whether a Tobin tax is feasible is equally important. Not only critics of the Tobin tax 
but also some of its proponents claim that it may not be feasible. Even James Tobin 
doubts.
36 The case of enforcement goes hand in hand with the question of how the 
Tobin tax might be avoided. There are two possible ways. One can switch the foreign 
exchange trade to jurisdictions where no transactions tax is imposed. Alternatively, one 
changes his product mix. The later possibility includes using established derivatives that 
are not subject to the tax or financial innovations that will be created to avoid the tax. 
Yet, this will not be examined in the following, since the recommendation is clear-cut: 
The tax base has to be as broad as possible not to create distortions on the foreign ex-
change markets and between other financial markets. This chapter concentrates on the 
first possibility of tax avoidance – the ‘jurisdictional shopping’. It will be worked out 




                                                           
35 See Nunnenkamp (2001), p.15. 
36 See Tobin (1978) or Frankel (1996).  
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4.1 How Foreign Exchange is Traded 
 
The foreign exchange market is divided into two segments. In the wholesale market 
dealers trade amongst each other bilaterally. Through these pure interbank transactions, 
the prices for foreign currencies are quoted. In the retail market, dealers or banks re-
spectively meet the customers’ needs resulting from foreign trade or investments for 
example. Contrarily to most stock markets the foreign exchange market hence is decen-
tralized and dealer-driven; contracts are over-the-counter (OTC) leading to a non-
transparent nature of the market. The most sizeable markets within the foreign exchange 
market are the spot market and the market for swaps.  
A foreign exchange transaction takes place on three different sites. The dealing site is 
where the dealers as trading partners are located. Dealers are staff of a bank. Normally 
dealers are situated in a dealing room in financial centers independent from the location 
of the bank’s head office. The dealing room is like a subsidiary of the bank. The loca-
tion where the deals are booked is called booking site. In many cases, it is the head of-
fice of the bank but also can vary. Every foreign exchange transaction at least has two 
settlement sites since two or more currencies are traded. A settlement site is where the 
bank balances are transferred between the parties. Assume two German banks, which 
trade Euros against US-Dollars. Then one settlement site is the European Central Bank 
in Frankfurt, the other one will be a bank in the USA if both banks have their dollar 




4.2 The Kenen-Proposal  
 
The key question now becomes which of the three sites seems to be best for levying the 
Tobin tax. Kenen (1996) argues that the settlement sites are not suitable since too many 
gross transactions are netted before they are settled. Moreover, not all transactions that 
are settled are through the foreign exchange market and thus should not be subject to the 
tax. The shortcoming of taxing the transaction at the booking site is that the Tobin tax 
could easily be avoided by putting some computers in jurisdictions without a Tobin tax. 
All transactions would be booked there. Kenen suggests levying the Tobin tax on the 
dealing sites. For this case, two ways of collecting the tax can be distinguished. On the 
one hand, all forex transactions of all international dealing rooms of one bank could be 
                                                           
37 See for example Kenen (1996).  
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taxed on a national basis, which means in the country of the bank’s headquarter. On the 
other hand, all forex transactions taking place in one market place could be taxed there, 
no matter what the nationality of the bank is. Although collecting the tax on the national 
basis would deter tax avoidance, Kenen proposes to collect it on a market basis. The 
former way of collection would impose some extra costs of consolidating data on the 
banks and favors banks whose governments did not impose a Tobin tax. Moreover, 
countries with big foreign exchange markets but few local banks would have no incen-
tive to levy a Tobin tax on a national basis. The plan suggests collecting the tax on the 
dealing site according to the paper trail between the trading parties with respect to the 
status of the counterparty. If the transaction is interdealer in the wholesale market, each 
dealer will be charged half the Tobin tax rate whereas in the retail market the tax is pay-
able full. The tax burden for the bank and for the customer then depends on how the 
additional costs are shared.    
 
 
4.3 Is the Tobin Tax Feasible?  
 
Kenen’s proposal sounds sensible but there remain some doubts whether the Tobin tax 
collected that way is really feasible and desirable. First, every dealer has to know the 
status of his counterparty since in the case of interdealer transactions every party carries 
only half the tax. This implies some additional costs since lists of dealers must be up-
dated and applied every transaction. Second, transactions between two non-bank traders 
would be tax-free. Third, transactions between small currencies would be taxed twice 
since a vehicle currency like the US-Dollar is used. Exempting those trades would cause 
the tax collection to become more complicated and it is difficult to discover those trans-
actions, which include in fact a vehicle currency.  
However, the real problem is the requirement of international cooperation between tax 
authorities. If one country is not willing to impose a Tobin tax, there will be strong in-
centives for banks to move their dealing rooms there to avoid the tax. The winners of 
this tax competition could be offshore centers as tax havens like the Cayman Islands as 
a prominent example. Of course, migration to a tax-free location is costly and risky es-
pecially for the case that this tax haven does not have good infrastructure for exchange 
trading.
38 Moreover, if not all banks establish their dealing rooms in the tax-free juris-
diction simultaneously, one of them will be the first. Imposing a punishing tax at a high 
                                                           
38 Griffith-Jones (1996).   
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rate on all transactions with this bank could hinder to avoid the tax that way. But the 
more banks have moved offshore the greater the network effect and the smaller the ef-
fect of punishment. Some argue that it would be sufficient, if all members of the G-7 
countries, Singapore, Hong Kong and Switzerland agreed to impose the Tobin tax since 
nearly total volume of foreign exchange is traded therein. Palley (2001) states that hold-
ing expensive equity capital as required for the BIS standard has an equivalent effect as 
a Tobin tax. But experience suggests that there was no shift to jurisdictions where they 
are not applied. These standards are regarded as good housekeeping. Hence, the interna-
tional enforcement of the Tobin tax as a standard is a matter of political will. However, 
one must not neglect the case of shifting to tax-free jurisdictions if only one country 
lures foreign banks by not imposing the tax. All the banks that are charged the Tobin tax 
might lose connection to the foreign exchange markets due to competitive advantages of 
those not being taxed. For the case that local banks can avoid the tax by shifting the 
dealing rooms to tax havens, the part of the bank located in the home country will be 
not more than a lender which finances the foreign exchange transactions of its offshore 
subsidiary.
39 And countries do have incentives not to impose the Tobin tax since bank-
ing and especially exchange trading is a highly paid job which yields positive spillover 
effects on other businesses and on society.
40 
 
Proponents of the Tobin tax call for international cooperation of national authorities. 
Moreover, an international organization like the IMF or the Worldbank should coordi-
nate the implementation and monitoring of the Tobin tax as well as the distribution of 
its revenues.
41 Schmidt (2000) proposes to collect the Tobin tax on the settlement site 
since technological innovations which are designed to eliminate settlement risks make it 
now possible to detect taxable gross transactions before netted, no matter whether the 
payments were made onshore or offshore.  
These proposals illustrate that imposing a Tobin tax involves besides economical also 
political and technical problem due to its feasibility. However, even if there existed a 
political will for imposing the tax and  - against all odds – if there was global agreement 
on a uniform Tobin tax arrangement, a levy would not be desirable since the Tobin tax 
bears too many economic shortcomings.  
 
                                                           
39 Garber (1996). 
40 See Kasa (1999). 
41 Griffith-Jones (1996). 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
On the one hand, international financial markets are necessary for the functioning of all 
other markets especially for markets of internationally traded goods. On the other hand, 
super-efficient financial markets due to globalization can have deep impacts on national 
economies - for example, the loss of monetary autonomy, high volatility of the ex-
change rate that leads to uncertainty or herd behavior of the speculators causing cur-
rency attacks. A Tobin tax might be a compromise between totally free and strongly 
regulated international financial markets.  
Chapter 2.1 describes the Tobin tax proposal. At a first sight the Tobin tax seems to be 
persuasive. It discourages short-term speculation that is said to destabilize whereas de-
sirable investments face a much lower tax burden. But the functioning of the Tobin tax 
is not that clear-cut. Extending a Frankel model in chapter 2.3, which shows how the 
Tobin tax can function hints at the possibility of a contrary effect when the expected 
depreciation of the foreign currency is large. The Tobin tax proposal is based on the 
assumption that short-term trading is speculative and destabilizing. There are some 
theoretical and empirical counterarguments, above all the ‘hot potato trading’ as a hedg-
ing strategy amongst dealers when a customer order shifts a bank’s portfolio out of bal-
ance (chapter 2.5). These trades are assumed to amount up to 70 per cent of total vol-
ume of the foreign exchange market. Taxing hot potato trading would be foolish since it 
lowers market risks and leads to lower prices. Moreover, real investments and trade in 
goods and services might be discriminated because there are some possibilities for ‘hot 
money’ to avoid the tax or at least to lower the tax burden. A strong reason for taxing 
speculation is excessive wasting of resources in order to get some informational lead 
over market competitors. But the success of the Tobin tax in discouraging this ‘rent-
seeking’ depends on its questionable ability to deter short-term speculation.  
Chapter 3 suggests that the Tobin tax is not an efficient measure to prevent currency 
crises since an additional transactions cost of some basis points will not be deterrent, if 
high returns are expected by attacking a currency. The ability of a Tobin tax to generate 
some monetary autonomy is quite poor especially for the long run. Since super-efficient 
international financial markets have negative external effects on the economy and on the 
monetary authority, the Tobin can be justified as a Pigouvian tax.
42 However, as a 
measure to prevent currency crises, it must be imposed globally or at least amongst the 
                                                           
42 See Palley (1999) and Pierdzioch/Stadtmann (2000). 
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major financial markets (chapter 4). Thus, in addition to theoretical economic doubts 
about the Tobin tax there arise some political problems, which can make the Tobin tax 
to become infeasible.   
 
There is not doubt about that financial crises must be prevented and that other globaliza-
tion risks – namely national monetary dependency and market insecurity – have to be 
diminished. But before calling for any measure like the Tobin tax one has to detect the 
real causes. Surely, failures of international financial markets have contributed to many 
of today’s problems, but are they really the initial cause? As the financial crises of the 
1990s especially the Mexican Crisis 1994/95 and the East Asian Crises 1997/98 have 
shown, panic amongst exchange traders causes them to pull out their money what leads 
to a currency fire in that country.
43 Nevertheless, panic also has its causes. Moral hazard 
and adverse selection due to asymmetric information can be sources of destabilizing the 
economy as well as unexpected news about bad macroeconomic fundamentals or unsta-
ble policy (Mishkin (1998) and Siebert (1998)). According to crises of the 1990s, the 
dismantling of emerging markets was too fast a process since western industrialized 
countries called on emerging countries to open up their financial markets without being 
prepared for this challenge (Tobin (1998)). These markets did not obtain sophisticated 
bank sectors and bank supervision what led to moral hazard and systematic risk. 
  
Protectionism on international financial markets would be a step back since its desirable 
functions of spreading risks and coordinating international division of labor would be 
partially lost. A Tobin tax is a political tool, which permanently controls international 
capital movements and does not distinguish between poor and highly sophisticated fi-
nancial markets. As a measure to diminish globalization risks, it had to be imposed 
temporary and only on less sophisticated markets (De Grauwe (2000)). The theory of 
Guembel/Sussman (2001) suggests that highly sophisticated markets do not bear that 
much risks since there exist instruments for market participants to insure themselves in 
the case of high exchange rate fluctuations. They conclude that most emerging countries 
need not put sand in the wheels of financial markets because they have sand aplenty. It 
would be foolish to think the Tobin tax is a panacea ignoring the real causes of the 
globalization risks. In contrast, an expected Tobin tax levy itself could create panic 
(Bird/Rajan (2001)).  
                                                           
43 See Aschinger (2001), p.24ff; De Grauwe (2000), p.397ff.  
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Although the concept of a Tobin tax has been discussed in many parliaments and there 
seems to be willingness also in Germany to tax foreign exchange transactions
44 not all 
official statements are enthusiastic. The Enquete Commission of the German Parliament 
(see BMF (2000)) claim that there are practical and political problems of imposing the 
Tobin tax and that its costs might be higher than its benefits. A study of the European 
Parliament (2000) is skeptical whether a Tobin tax would be effective and suggests the 
Tobin tax to be only a part of an internationally coordinated framework. The only ar-
gument for the Tobin tax that is really interesting for policy makers seems to be the 
revenue raising function that does not justify the levy.
45  
Further research would be modeling the Tobin tax in a microeconomic framework with 
risk-avers investors and assets of different return and risk. A transactions tax might be 
able to dampen excessive international capital flow and speculation since it influences 
asset diversification decisions.  
                                                           
44 See Deutscher Bundestag (2002). 
45 For Siebert (1998), Mishkin (1998) and Greenspan (1998) measures to diminish globalization risks 
efficiently would be stabilizing the banking sector through reforms and effective bank supervision, politi-
cal transparency in economic affairs, setting realistic exchange rate targets as well as sustainable policy.  
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